Category Archives: Freedom of expression

The Legal Challenges of Social Media

Legal Challenges of social media imageHow has the law adapted to the emergence and proliferation of social media tools and digital technology? Furthermore, how successful has the law been in governing the challenges associated with an ongoing reformulation of our understandings of public and private spaces in the online environment?

These were the key questions discussed by a panel of experts at the Information Law and Policy Centre earlier this month. The event heralded the launch of a new book entitled the ‘Legal Challenges of Social Media’ edited by Dr David Mangan (City Law School) and Dr Lorna Gillies (University of Strathclyde).  A number of the book’s authors provided insights into the contents of their individual chapters.

Social Media and Press Regulation

Professor Ian Walden began proceedings with a discussion of his chapter on press regulation. His chapter was informed by his own experience on the board of the Press Complaints Commission (PCC) between 2009 and 2014.

Walden started by addressing the question of what constitutes “press law”. Walden highlighted that for the most part journalists and editors are subject to the same law as most people – there is no special ‘public interest’ defence or journalistic exemption for hacking into the voicemail of a mobile phone user for example. At the same time, journalists abide (to varying degrees) to an Editors’ Code which goes beyond the provisions of the law. In this context, the online environment and social media has rendered press regulation even more complex in a number of ways.

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Submissions to the Law Commission’s consultation on ‘Official Data Protection’: Transparency International UK

The Law Commission has invited interested parties to write submissions commenting on the proposals outlined in a consultation report on ‘official data protection’. The consultation period closed for submissions on 3 May, although some organisations have been given an extended deadline. (For more detailed background on the Law Commission’s work please see the first post in this series). 

The Information Law and Policy Centre is re-publishing some of the submissions written by stakeholders and interested parties in response to the Law Commission’s consultation report (pdf) to our blog. In due course, we will collate the submissions on a single resource page. If you have written a submission for the consultation you would like (re)-published please contact us

Please note that none of the published submissions reflect the views of the Information Law and Policy Centre which aims to promote and facilitate cross-disciplinary law and policy research, in collaboration with a variety of national and international institutions.

The seventh submission in our series is the response submitted by Transparency International UK

(Previous submissions published in this series: Open Rights Group, CFOI and Article 19, The Courage FoundationLibertyPublic Concern at Work and The Institute of Employment Rights)

Download (PDF, 249KB)

Submissions to the Law Commission’s consultation on ‘Official Data Protection’: Open Rights Group

In response to a Cabinet Office request in 2015, the Law Commission has been reviewing relevant statutes – the Official Secrets Act in particular – to “examine the effectiveness of the criminal law provisions that protect Government information from unauthorised disclosure.” The review is believed to be necessary to “ensure that the law is keeping pace with the challenges of the 21st century.” 

As part of this work, the Law Commission published a consultation report on ‘official data protection’. The Law Commission’s report has already attracted significant criticism from the media and whistleblowing organisations which regarded the proposals as a potential assault on free speech and freedom of the press. There were also concerns about the extent to which the Law Commission had consulted with NGOs and media organisations. Defending the report, Law Commissioner Professor David Ormerod QC argued that the Law Commission had considered “carefully the freedom of expression and public interest issues”.

The Law Commission has invited interested parties to write submissions commenting on the proposals outlined in the report. The consultation period closed for submissions on 3 May, although some organisations have been given an extended deadline.

The Information Law and Policy Centre will be re-publishing some of the submissions written by stakeholders and interested parties in response to the Law Commission’s consultation report (pdf) to our blog. In due course, we will collate the submissions on a single resource page. If you have written a submission for the consultation you would like (re)-published please contact us.

Please note that none of the published submissions reflect the views of the Information Law and Policy Centre which aims to promote and facilitate cross-disciplinary law and policy research, in collaboration with a variety of national and international institutions.

We will begin with the Open Rights Group submission which was first published on their website and was accompanied by a press release.

OPEN RIGHTS GROUP: LAW COMMISSION CONSULTATION ON PROTECTION OF OFFICIAL DATA 2017

Introduction

The Law Commission is an independent body that reviews UK legislation and identifies where reform is needed. In 2015, the Cabinet Office asked the Law Commission to look into the UK’s laws around the disclosure of official data.

For reasons explained fully below, ORG’s view is that the Law Commission consultation paper[1] is shoddy and confused, contradictory, poorly researched, and ill-informed on public interest issues. It follows a review that has markedly failed to conduct full, independent and balanced investigation. The consultation paper appears to be based mainly on opinions and hopes from government and security and intelligence agency representatives. It is generally argumentative rather than evidence-based.

The report contains detailed legal analyses and comparative studies, but in relation to the application of the law, the evidence supporting changes is limited to an asserted need for more up to date language and unsubstantiated concerns that the current framework may not be robust enough to deal with the Internet. However, the report does not explore what specific changes and challenges the Internet and digitisation bring.

The report fails to demonstrate how current secrecy laws have, in practice, worked or failed, or to consider the evidence of important recent espionage or leaking cases and investigations. As drafted, it fails to make the case for the reforms proposed, other than by deploying rhetoric.

Therefore, ORG cannot support the proposed full rewriting of espionage and secrecy legislation until a full and proper analysis is produced. This should contain explanatory evidence of the risks to the state and the public interest posed by new technologies, but also of the possible risks for pervasive surveillance and clamping down on whistleblowers. Continue reading

Event: “The Legal Challenges of Social Media”

This event took place at the Information Law and Policy Centre at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies on Thursday, 6 July 2017.

Date: 6 July 2017
Time: 15:00 to 17:00
Venue: Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 17 Russell Square, London WC1B 5DR
Book now: Free event. Advanced registration on the SAS booking site required.

Social Media phone picThe Legal Challenges of Social Media

Chairs: David Mangan, City Law School, and Lorna Gillies, University of Strathclyde

Contributors include: 
Ian Walden, Queen Mary, University of London
Daithí Mac Síthigh, University of Newcastle
Edina Harbinja, University of Hertfordshire and University of Strathclyde
Lorna Woods, University of Essex

Social media enables instant access to individual self-expression and the sharing of information. Social media issues are boundless, permeating distinct legal disciplines. The law has struggled to adapt and for good reason: how does the law regulate this medium over the public/private law divide?

This event will facilitate a discussion of this critical issue and others included in a new book: The Legal Challenges of Social Media (edited by David Mangan and Lorna E Gillies, Edward Elgar, 2017). The book engages with the legal implications of social media from public and private law perspectives and outlines how the law, in various legal sub-disciplines and with varying success, has endeavoured to adapt existing tools to social media.

Book online on the SAS bookings website.
Photo: Jason Howie, (CC BY 2.0)

UNESCO report: surveillance and data collection are putting journalists and sources at risk

In this guest post for World Press Freedom Day, Julie Posetti at the University of Wollongong, analyses how mass surveillance and data retention regimes are threatening journalists’ sources. Her new UNESCO report explores similar themes to the Information Law and Policy Centre’s own research in this area

File 20170503 4102 1v6ex7vThe ability of journalists to report without fear is under threat from mass surveillance and data retention. The Conversation

Released this week, my UNESCO report Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age shows that laws protecting journalists and sources globally are not keeping up with the challenges posed by indiscriminate data collection and the spill-over effects of anti-terrorism and national security legislation.

Examining legal changes to how sources are protected across 121 countries between 2007-2015, I found that calls, text messages, and emails made in the process of reporting are increasingly exposed. In particular, they can be caught up in the nets of law enforcement and national security agencies as they trawl for evidence of criminal activity and terrorism, and conduct leak investigations.

Source protection laws should be updated to protect the online communications of journalists and whistleblowers.

If we do not strengthen legal protections and limit the impact of surveillance and data retention, investigative journalism that relies on confidential sources will be difficult to sustain. Continue reading

Communicating Responsibilities: The Spanish DPA targets Google’s Notification Practices when Delisting Personal Information

In this guest post, David Erdos, University Lecturer in Law and the Open Society, University of Cambridge, considers the 2016 Resolution made by the Spanish Data Protection Authority in relation to Google’s approach to de-listing personal information. 

Spanish Data protection authorityThe Court of Justice’s seminal decision in Google Spain (2014) represented more the beginning rather than the endpoint of specifying the European data protection obligations of search engines when indexing material from the web and, as importantly, ensuring adherence to this.

In light of its over 90% market share of search, this issue largely concerns Google (even Bing and Yahoo come in a very distant second and third place).  To its credit, Google signalled an early willingness to comply with Google Spain.  At the same time, however, it construed this narrowly.  Google argued that it only had to remove specified URL links following ex post demands from individual European citizens and/or residents (exercising the right to erasure (A. 12c) and or objection (A. 14)), only as regards searches made under their name, only on European-badged search searches (e.g. .uk, .es) and even if the processing violated European data protection standards not if the processing was judged to be in the ʻpublic interestʼ.

It also indicated that it would inform the Webmasters of the ʻoriginalʼ content when de-listing took place (although it signalled that it would stop short of its usual practice of providing a similar notification to individual users of its services, opting instead for a generic notice only).

In the subsequent two and a half years, Google’s approach has remained in broad terms relatively stable (although from early 2015 it did stop notifying Webmasters when de-listing material from malicious porn sites (p. 29) and from early 2016 it has deployed (albeit imperfect) geolocation technology to block the return of de-listing results when using any of version of the Google search engine (e.g. .com) from the European country from where the demand was lodged).

Many (although not all) of these limitations are potentially suspect under European data protection, and indeed private litigants have (successfully and unsuccessfully) already brought a number of challenges.  No doubt partly reflecting their very limited resources, European Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) have adopted a selective approach, targeting only those issues which they see as the most critical.  Indeed, the Article 29 Working Party November 2014 Guidelines focussed principally on two concerns:

  • Firstly, that the geographical scope of de-listing was too narrow. To ensure “effective and complete protection” of individual data subjects, it was necessary that de-listing be “effective on all relevant domains, including .com”.
  • Secondly, that communication to third parties of data concerning de-listing identifiable to particular data subjects should be both very limited and subject to strong discipline. Routine communication “to original webmasters that results relating to their content had been delisted” was simply unlawful and, whilst in “particularly difficult cases” it might in principle be legitimate to contact such publishers prior to making a de-listing decision, even here search engines must then “take all necessary measures to properly safeguard the rights of the affected data subject”.

Since the release of the Guidelines, the French DPA has famously (or infamously depending on your perspective!) adopted a strict interpretation of the first concern requiring de-listing on a completely global scale and fining Google €100K for failing to do this.  This action has now been appealed before the French Conseil d’État and much attention has been given to this including by Google itself.  In contrast, much less publicity has been given to the issue of third party communication.

Nevertheless, in September 2016 the Spanish DPA issued a Resolution fining Google €150K for disclosing information identifiable to three data subjects to Webmasters and ordered it to adopt measures to prevent such practices reoccurring.  An internal administrative appeal lodged by Google against this has now been rejected and a challenge in court now seems inevitable.  This piece explores the background to, nature of and justification for this important regulatory development.

The Determinations Made in the Spanish Resolution

Apart from the fact that they had formally complained, there was nothing unusual in the three individual cases analysed in the Spanish Resolution.  Google had simply followed its usual practice of informing Webmasters that under data protection law specified URLs had been deindexed against a particular (albeit not directly specified) individual name.  Google sought to defend this practice on four separate grounds:

  • Firstly, it argued that the information provided to Webmasters did not constitute personal data at all. In contrast, the Spanish regulator argued that in those cases where the URL led to a webpage in which only one natural person was mentioned then directly identifiable data had been reported, whilst even in those cases where several people were mentioned the information was still indirectly identifiable since a simple procedure (e.g. conducting a search on names linked to the webpage in question) would render the information fully identified.  (Google’s argument here in any case seemed to be in tension with its practice since September 2015 of inviting contacted Webmasters to notify Google of any reason why the de-listing decision should be reconsidered – this would only really make sense if the Webmaster could in fact deduce what specific de-listing had in fact taken place).
  • Second, it argued that, since its de-listing form stated that it “may provide details to webmaster(s) of the URLs that have been removed from our search results”, any dissemination had taken place with the individual’s consent. Drawing especially on European data protection’s requirement that consent be “freely given” (A. 2 (h)) this was also roundly rejected.  In using the form to exercise their legal rights, individuals were simply made to accept as a fait accompli that such dissemination might take place.
  • Third, it argued that dissemination was nevertheless a compatible” (A. 6 (1) (b)) processing of the data given the initial purpose of its collection, finding a legal basis as necessary” for the legitimate interests (A. 7 (f)) of Webmasters regarding this processing (e.g. to contact Google for a reconsideration). The Spanish DPA doubted that Webmasters could have any legitimate interest here since “search engines do not recognize a legal right of publishers to have their contents indexed and displayed, or displayed in a particular order”, the Court of Justice had only referenced that the interests of the search engine itself and Internet users who might receive the information were engaged and, furthermore, had been explicit that de-listing rights applied irrespective of whether the information was erased at source or even if publication there remained lawful.  In any case, it emphasized that any such interest had (as article 7 (f) explicitly states) to be balanced with the rights and freedoms of data subjects which the Court had emphasized must be “effective and complete” in this context.  In contrast, Google’s practice of essentially unsafeguarded disclosure of the data to Webmasters could result in the effective extinguishment of the data subject’s rights since Webmasters had variously republished the deindexed page against another URL, published lists of all URLs deindexed or even published a specific news story on the de-listing decision.
  • Fourth, Google argued that its practice was an instantiation of the data subject’s right to obtain from a controller “notification to third parties to whom the data have been disclosed of any rectification, erasure or blocking” carried out in compliance with the right to erasure “unless this provides impossible or involves a disproportionate effort” (A. 12 (c)). The Spanish regulator pointed out that since the data in question had originally been received from rather than disclosed to Webmasters, this provision was not even materially engaged.  In any case, Google’s interpretation of it was in conflict with its purpose which was to ensure the full effectiveness of the data subject’s right to erasure.

Having established an infringement of the law, the Spanish regulator had to consider whether to pursue this as an illegal communication of data (judged ʻvery seriousʼ under Spanish data law) or only as a breach of secrecy (which is judged merely as ʻseriousʼ).  In the event, it plumped for the latter and issued a fine of €150K which was in the mid-range of that set out for ʻseriousʼ infringements.  As previously noted, it also injuncted Google to adopt measures to prevent re-occurrence of these legal failings and required that these be communicated to the Spanish DPA.

Analysis

This Spanish DPA’s action tackles a systematic practice which has every potential to fundamentally undermine practical enjoyment of rights to de-listing and is therefore at least as significant as the ongoing regulatory developments in France which relate to the geographical scope of these rights.  It was entirely right to find that personal data had been disseminated, that this had been done without consent, that the processing had nothing to do with the right (which, in any case, is not an obligation) of data subjects to have third parties notified in certain circumstances and that this processing was “incompatible” with the initial purpose of data collection which was to ensure data subject’s legal rights to de-listing.

It is true that the Resolution was too quick to dismiss the idea that original Webmasters do have “legitimate interests” in guarding against unfair de-listings of content.  Even in the absence of a de jure right to such listings, these interests are grounded in their fundamental right to “impart” information (and ideas), an aspect of freedom of expression (ECHR, art. 10; EU Charter, art. 11).   In principle, these rights and interests justify search engines making contact with original Webmasters, at the least as the Working Party itself indicated in particularly difficult de-listing cases.

However, even here dissemination must (as the Working Party also emphasized) properly safeguard the rights and interest of data subjects.  At the least this should mean that, prior to any dissemination, a search engine should conclude a binding and effectively policeable legal contract prohibiting Webmasters from disseminating the data in identifiable form.  (In the absence of this, those Webmasters out of European jurisdiction or engaged in special/journalistic expression cannot necessarily be themselves criticized for making use of the information received in other ways).

In stark contrast to this, Google currently engages in blanket and essentially unsafeguarded reporting to Webmasters, a practice which has resulted in a breakdown of effective protection for data subjects not just in Spain but also in other European jurisdictions such as the UK – see here and here.  Having been put on such clear notice by this Spanish action, it is to be hoped the Google will seriously modify its practices.  If not, then regulators would have every right to deal with this in the future as a (yet more serious) illegal and intentional communication of personal data.

Future Spanish Regulatory Vistas

The cases investigated by the Spanish DPA noted in this Resolution also involved the potential dissemination of data to the Lumen transparency database (formally Chilling Effects) which is hosted in the United States, the potential for subsequent publication of identifiable data on its publicly accessible database and even the potential for a specific notification to be provided to Google users conducting relevant name searches detailing that “[i]n response to a legal requirement sent to Google, we have removed [X] result(s) from this page.  If you wish, you can get more information about this requirement on LumenDatabase.org.

This particular investigation, however, failed to uncover enough information on these important matters.  Google was adamant that it had not yet begun providing information to Lumen in relation to data protection claims post-Google Spain, but stated that it was likely to do so in the future in some form.  Meanwhile, it indicated that the specific Lumen notifications which were found on name searches regarding two of the claimants concerned pre-Google Spain claims variously made under defamation, civil privacy law and also data protection.  (Even putting to one side the data protection claim, such practices would still amount to a processing of personal data and also highlight the often marginal and sometimes arbitrary distinctions between these very related legal causes of action).

Given these complications, the Spanish regulator decided not to proceed directly regarding these matters but rather open more wide-ranging investigatory proceedings concerning both Google’s practices in relation to disclosure to Lumen and also notification provided to search users.  Both sets of investigatory proceedings are ongoing.  Such continuing work highlights the vital need for active regulatory engagement to ensure that the individual rights of data subjects are effectively secured.  Only in this way will basic European data protection norms continue to ʻcatch upʼ not just with Google but with developments online generally.

David Erdos, University Lecturer in Law and the Open Society, Faculty of Law & WYNG Fellow in Law, Trinity Hall, University of Cambridge.

(I am grateful to Cristina Pauner Chulvi and Jef Ausloos for their thoughts on a draft of this piece.)

This post first appeared on the Inforrm blog. 

Media Freedom: ‘Without action the Commonwealth’s fine words will fail to impress.’

ICommonwealth flagn this guest post, journalist and Africa analyst Martin Plaut, calls on the Commonwealth to take a more robust view on new threats to journalistic independence. Do they challenge democracy and human rights as much as freedom of speech?

The Commonwealth has a problem: it has little credibility on the question of media freedom. Its members adopted a Human Rights Charter in March 2013 which stated plainly that: ‘We are committed to peaceful, open dialogue and the free flow of information, including through a free and responsible media, and to enhancing democratic traditions and strengthening democratic processes.’ Yet many of them have a less than savoury record in this area.

Out of 180 states assessed by Reporters Without Borders, Brunei is 155th, Singapore 154th and Swaziland 153rd. This is the summary of Brunei’s media offered by the BBC: ‘Brunei’s media are neither diverse nor free. The private press is either owned or controlled by the royal family, or exercises self-censorship on political and religious matters.’ Much the same could be said of Swaziland, while in Singapore the media is largely state-owned and journalists are restricted by rigorous defamation and contempt laws (The Guardian).

Where there has been dissent and opposition they have been suppressed. Consider the case of the Gambia, which left the Commonwealth in 2013. The newly installed President, Adama Barrow, has announced that it will return. In the upheaval and tension surrounding his election and the refusal of his processor, Yahya Jammeh, to accept the result, social media were disrupted. Twitter and WhatsApp, which had been used to organise resistance to President Jammeh’s rule, were unavailable, as the internet was cut. The return of social media was hailed as an indication that his 22 year rule was finally over.

Commonwealth journalists have now begun agitating for the organisation to take a more robust view. A Centre for Freedom of the Media has been established, led by William Horsley (another former BBC journalist). He welcomed the call by the new Commonwealth secretary-general, Patricia Scotland, for a ‘vibrant and responsible media’ and her claim that this is ‘vital to advancing our Commonwealth goals of democracy, development, rule of law and respect for diversity.’

But, as William Horsley points out, warm words are not enough. He called for action to support the declarations: ‘Journalists in the Commonwealth Journalists Association (CJA), together with the Commonwealth Press Union Media Trust and some experienced lawyers and members of other professional groups associated with the Commonwealth, argue that it is high time for that to change. We are putting forward draft proposals for a Commonwealth Charter on the media and good governance, to be accompanied by effective mechanisms for assessing and helping to deliver remedies for serious and persistent violations.’

The media is a vital watchdog across the developing world. In many countries it is among the last effective forms of resistance to corruption and misrule. One only has to think of the role of the independent media in curbing the abuses of the Zuma government to see that this is the case. Yet they pay a high price for this work.

As William Horsley rightly observes: ‘The reality is that many journalists or bloggers have been attacked or even killed for their work in recent years in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Nigeria and Uganda, all Commonwealth states,’ (Time for a new Commonwealth initiative on media freedom).

It is time that these abuses end and that the perpetrators of these attacks are tried for their crimes. Without action the Commonwealth’s fine words will fail to impress.

This post first appeared on the School of Advanced Studies, Talking Humanities blog

Martin Plaut is a journalist and senior research fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies at the School of Advanced Study, University of London. 

He will be speaking at The Commonwealth and Challenges to Media Freedom conference (4–5 April at Senate House), organised by the Institute of Commonwealth Studies.

It’s the inaugural event of the School’s Centre of Commonwealth and Media Freedom, and will bring together leading Commonwealth journalists, academics, lawyers, magistrates, judges, policymakers and human rights practitioners. Advance registration is required. Tickets: standard (£40), concessions (£15).

Conference: The Commonwealth and Challenges to Media Freedom

Media freedom 250pxDate
4 Apr 2017, 10:00 to 5 Apr 2017, 18:00

Venue
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies
17 Russell Square, London WC1B 5DR

Book Online: SAS Events Calendar

Description: Convenor: Sue Onslow, ICwS Senior Lecturer and Co-Investigator, The Oral History of the Commonwealth Project

This conference will draw together members of the Commonwealth Journalists Association, the Commonwealth Lawyers and Magistrates and Judges Association, as well as journalists and policy makers. The two day meeting will address government channels and information flows (looking at the examples of government interference and restrictions in Malaysia, South Africa, Botswana and Sri Lanka); media, elections and post-election contests (with East and Central African case studies of Uganda, Kenya and Rwanda); and the particular challenges facing journalists, bloggers and social media in low-intensity conflict zones (Kashmir, Pakistan and Bangladesh).  The Institute feels strongly there is no room for complacency in the UK in the post-Leveson environment, nor should the Indian government and society feel itself immune from regional manifestations of threats and personal violence. Therefore these aspects will also be included in the discussion.

Confirmed Speakers:

Kishali Pinto Jayawardena
Gwen Lister, Executive Chair: Namibia Media Trust (NMT)
Irene Ovonji Odida, Exec. Director, Uganda Assoc. of Women Lawyers
Dan Branch, University of Warwick
William Crawley, ICwS
Kiran Hassan, SOAS
Kayode Samuel
Nupur Basu

Kindly sponsored by SAS, the Commonwealth Press Union Media Trust, The Round Table and Asian Affairs

Registration Fee: Standard – £40, Concessions – £15

Further Information: Speaker BiosConference Outline

Signed Statement Condemns DHS Proposal to Demand Passwords to Enter the U.S.

A group of 50 organisations and nearly 90 individual experts have signed a statement against the US Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) proposal to ask non-citizens to provide the passwords to their social media accounts in order to enter the United States.

The social media password proposal was raised by Secretary John Kelly at the House Homeland Security Committee hearing on 7th February.

The signed statement, which has been organised by the Center for Democracy & Technology, recognises the United States Government’s need to protect its borders but argues that a “blanket policy of demanding passwords” would “undermine security, privacy, and other rights”.

To view the full statement with list of signatories please click here.

Call for papers: Critical Research in Information Law

Deadline 15 March 2017

The Information Law Group at the University of Sussex is pleased to announce its annual PhD and Work in Progress Workshop on 3 May 2017. The workshop, chaired by Professor Chris Marsden, will provide doctoral students with an opportunity to discuss current research and receive feedback from senior scholars in a highly focused, informal environment. The event will be held in conjunction with the Work in Progress Workshop on digital intermediary law.

We encourage original contributions critically approaching current information law and policy issues, with particular attention on the peculiarities of information law as a field of research. Topics of interest include:

  • internet intermediary liability
  • net neutrality and media regulation
  • surveillance and data regulation
  • 3D printing
  • the EU General Data Protection Regulation
  • blockchain technology
  • algorithmic/AI/robotic regulation
  • Platform neutrality, ‘fake news’ and ‘anti-extremism’ policy.

How to apply: Please send an abstract of 500 words and brief biographical information to Dr Nicolo Zingales  by 15 March 2017. Applicants will be informed by 30 March 2017 if selected. Submission of draft papers by selected applicants is encouraged, but not required.

Logistics: 11am-1pm 3 May in the Moot Room, Freeman Building, University of Sussex.

Afternoon Workshop: all PhD attendees are registered to attend the afternoon workshop 2pm-5.30pm F22 without charge (programme here).

Financial Support: Information Law Group can repay economy class rail fares within the UK. Please inform the organizers if you need financial assistance.